Ik ben een psychologie van de ontologische status aan het bedenken.
Een copy paste.
There was some discussion about my thoughts and someone found the following essay:
http://www.unige.ch/lettres/philo/ensei ... ch/qua.pdf
Qua objects entered the contemporary philosophical stage in 1982, when Kit Fine wrote a short
note entitled "Acts, Events and Things". They have, though, a much longer history, dating back
at least as far as to Aristotle, though this is not something that will concern me here. A qua
object, according to Fine, is a special kind of intensional entity, consisting of a particular, say a
(its 'basis'), together with a property, say F (its 'gloss'), and denoted by "a qua F" (Fine 1982:
100). For any particular a and any property F there is such a qua object, which exists at times
and in worlds when and where a is F. Qua objects in Fine's sense are intensional entities: they
are identical only if they have the same glosses and they are distinct from their bases, though
they have them as constituents1 and exemplify, at any given time and in any given world, all the
properties of their bases which are not 'formal', i.e. which are not about the time or world in
question.
I wrote the following (perhaps you have some thoughts on this?),
This essay perhaps makes sense from both a logicians perspective or my ontologically constanty adaptive perspective if sharpened:
> I will show how they naturally arise in natural deduction,
Allowing that natural includes with a lot of redundant friction.. Yes.
>and how
powerful
> a tool they are
> to explain all kinds of substitutivity failures and associated
puzzles in
> the debates on material
> constitution, modes of presentation and belief ascription.
Just ask which categories are used.
Oh wait. That is taboo!
> I will
show how
> they could be used
> to streamline ontology, while at the same time providing
truthmakers galore
> and explaining,
> e.g., what essences are.
Essences are rubbish. Just complexes built from categories that can be useful in life in own mind and perhaps in discussion if not 'too far fetched for others'.
>I will criticize the only Ersatzist
construal I
> know of and then finally
> try to sketch some ways in which qua objects might be given a
place within
> one's favourite
> ontological picture, not offending our taste for desert landscapes.
Args! Favoured ontological pictures ? That is sheer 'I favor to see myself in such and such a way existentially'! How does it feel to be pushed or pulled in persona and when asked about the type of person you are you explain how to be existentially pushed or pulled?
Hypocricy!
> A qua
> object, according to Fine, is a special kind of intensional entity,
> consisting of a particular,
Special? Or direct?
>bases which are not 'formal', i.e. which are
not about
> the time or world in
> question.
Yes! My ontological experience needs not be confined by 2 dimensional formalisms which take ages to travel! Even with power jets! Add some categories and time AND space is irrelevant in thought.
Why use causal, space and time ontological experiences?
This coerces someone from mentally potential deep fluidity!
> They are, however, existentially dependent on properties, not on
predicates.
Erm. If one formalises dynamical category allocation one flattens it.
However, it gives can bridge towards the ontologically conscious indeed. Don't stay in flat zone!
> So far, this does not
> tell us much about the ontological status of qua objects.
As if it could.
Ontologically having status? Rubbish.
Relative status seen from an ontological perspective is not the same as defining the proportions of ontologies compared to eachother.
Status can only be defined by ontologies that allow enough categories. But that is not the final thing yet. Deeper ontologies can be found as well. If status is the end one will not come far enough.
In practice this means: "communication with implicit ontologies and growing your own by interaction and not by thought only". So this creates growing dependencies in regard to ontological self perception.
>Kit
Fine, e.g., is
> wary not to assign them
> too high a grade of being:
> "The acts, as qua objects, are in an obvious sense artificial and
> derivative.
True. They exist only on certain ontological plains. But that is not relevant. The relevance is that there are certain ontological planes.
> 1
> of an alliance with a purely intensional element. (It is tempting
to say
> that they are
> partly formed in our own minds, but this would be too
psychologistic)."
Empty: "too psychologistic".. Ok, how to be 'too psychologistic'? (rethorical note)
Alliance with pure intentional elements?
No, the psychologistic view can be a hermeneutical problem but still be ontologically sound and be sound qua ontologically confirming future existence of some individual.
If personal ontologies are not consistent with that of others it is either coerced in the neighbourhood of those others (no matter who gets right, tension is coercion ontologically) or those individuals don't near eachother and won't grow eachothers ontologies, this also not always prefered because the growing of ontologies for some can be the disaster for a lot.
> • a qua F is essentially F.
Wrong. a qua F if essentially being F not understood as the gloss of a.
One ponders F as long as a is not perceived in tense situations.
Ontologically when a is understood F can be created ad lib.
> 2 Why qua objects are useful
This is evident.
Without the concept of time one cannot solve time pressure problems.
If time pressure problems are called F, then time is a.
"IS time useful?"
errr...
For some barbarian it is not indeed because he knows no time pressure and his ontological status therefor is not being considered or in danger.
> In this section, I want to show how useful qua objects are (or, if
only they
> existed, would be) to
> solve a broad range of philosophical puzzles.
They do exist ontologically but not biologically.
> individual constant "a" not occurring in "Fx".
F can be a variable. a cannot be.
Variables have no ontological status, they are glosses of the a in question.
>It seems natural to
take UG
> to treat "a" in "Fa"
> as a term denoting a qua object, for all we know, and all we are
allowed to
> know, about the
> referent of "a" is that it is F. We have to make a choice, to be
sure, but
> our choice is arbitrary,
> as long as it is a choice among objects qua F.
No! with one F is IS true, but with a lot of F's repeating this creates tension so ontologically one can contextually compare all situations of F and one could associate what a is. This grows the ontological status of a and designifies F as ontological threat.
>The object we
>choose will
> have other properties as
> well: but none of them, intuitively, is a property of the object
chosen as
> it is in itself. ES, in turn,
> introduces an individual constant a denoting one qua object in
particular.
> Qua objects are also used in constructive mathematical proofs.
Suppose I
> want to demonstrate
> that the sum of a triangle's interior angles is 180 degrees. I
will draw a
> particular figure on the
> black board, say a. For my proof to be valid, I am not allowed to
make use
> of any properties of
> a not mentioned in the definition I gave of a triangle. If I have
defined,
> say, a triangle as a plane
> figure having three sides, I can make use of the fact that a has
three
> interior angles only if I have
> shown how trilaterality implies triangularity.
Yes. But this also again is wrong orientation with regard to a qua F, this is F qua a and a qua F here and there!. Not ontologically seen.
Write down that which comes to mind.
If you end up with 5 alternatives then write them all out. All have ontological significance.
> So I treat a as a
qua object:
Rubbish. a qua a is no need to ponder ontological status at all.
a qua a == nothing
if ontologically a qua a is found one can appreciate life. No ontological problems, one can live as the old barbarian but with the ontological technologies one needs at that instant of time.
Well, as of here my interests is lost.
Ciao!
Justin
